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Abstract
We investigate mean-field dynamics of a nonlinear opinion formation model with congregator
and contrarian agents. Each agent assumes one of the two possible states. Congregators imitate
the state of other agents with a rate that increases with the number of other agents in the opposite
state, as in the linear voter model and nonlinear majority voting models. Contrarians flip the state
with a rate that increases with the number of other agents in the same state. The nonlinearity
controls the strength of the majority voting and is used as a main bifurcation parameter. We show
that the model undergoes a rich bifurcation scenario comprising the egalitarian equilibrium, two
symmetric lopsided equilibria, limit cycle, and coexistence of different types of stable equilibria
with intertwining attrative basins.
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LEAD PARAGRAPH
When multiple competing options are available as in election, humans influence each other
as well as are influenced by external input such as mass media to determine their opinions.
Mechanisms of collective opinion formation have been studied with the use of various models
including the voter model, Ising model and its variants, and coupled phase oscillators. Here
we study dynamical behavior of a nonlinear opinion formation model with some contrarian
agents who try to avoid the opinion adopted by others. The remainder of agents are con-
gregator agents that imitate others’ opinions with a certain rate, as assumed in many other
models. We mainly investigate the bifurcation scenario of the mean-field dynamics of this
agent-based model, where the nonlinearity with which an agent complies with the majority
voting is taken as a chief bifurcation parameter. When the nonlinearity is weak, the model
allows egalitarian coexistence of the two competing opinions. At an intermediate level of
nonlinearity, the egalitarian equilibrium is not stable, and a limit cycle appears. With strong
nonlinearity, two asymmetric equilibria in which one opinion overwhelms the other opinion
are stable. The asymmetric equilibria coexist with the limit cycle, and the structure of the
attractive basins is progressively complicated as the nonlinearity is increased.
I. INTRODUCTION
In society, humans may possess different opinions about the same issue and communicate
with each other to update their opinions. Phenomenology and mechanisms of collective
opinion formation have been investigated with the use of various mathematical and agent-
based models [1, 2]. A basic assumption employed in most of these models is that individuals
tend to mimic others’ opinions. Then, all the individuals would eventually select the same
opinion, i.e., consensus is reached. Consensus is the expected outcome in, for example, the
voter model in finite populations and some infinite networks [1, 3–5], and majority vote
models in which individuals tend to adopt the majority’s opinion [6–11].
However, in real society, pure consensus seems to be an exception rather than a norm [12].
In meanfield populations, idiosyncratic preferences of individuals [13–16] and contrarians [6–
9, 11, 17–20] are among two driving forces to prevent consensus. Mechanisms of coexistence
has been also theoretically and numerically investigated in the context of regional language
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competition [1].
In the present study, we examine effects of contrarian agents in a nonlinear opinion
formation model. Nonlinear opinion formation models with contrarians have been shown to
exhibit phase transition between a consensus-like phase and an egalitarian phase [6–9, 11, 17–
19]. In the consensus-like phase, a majority of individuals takes one of the two opinions. The
egalitarian phase is characterized by a more equal proportions of individuals with different
opinions and facilitated by the existence of contrarian agents or behavior. A first customary
approach to the understanding of such a model is to look at equilibrium properties, rather
than dynamics, with analysis tools in statistical phyics [6–9, 11, 17–19]. A complementary
dynamical approach to opinion formation with contrarian agents was recently made with
the use of coupled Kuramoto oscillators with contrarian oscillators [21–23]. However, agents
in these studies are implicitly assumed to be intrinsic oscillators. Therefore, it is difficult to
link the dynamical results obtained from the oscillator model with contrarians to behavior of
the spin-based models such as oscillatory dynamics observed in discrete-time models [7, 24].
We investigate the equilibria and dynamics of a continuous-time nonlinear voter model
with contrarian agents. We extend an agent-based linear voter model with contrarians
proposed in Ref. [20] by introducing nonlinear interaction. Agents are not inherent oscillators
and do assume binary opinions as in the Ising and voter models. We numerically examine
the mean-field dynamics of the model in detail.
II. MODEL
We assume that there are two types of agents, congregator and contrarian, in the popu-
lation. Each agent possesses either of the two states (i.e., opinions), 0 and 1. Congregators
like other agents (i.e., congregators and contrarians) such that they are eager to posssess the
same state as others. Contrarians oppose other agents such that they try to avoid others’
states. It should be noted that agents do not have to distinguish the type of the partner
(i.e., congregator or contrarian) with whom they interact. We denote by X (0 < X < 1) and
Y ≡ 1−X the fraction of congregators and contrarians in the population, respectively. We
denote by x (0 ≤ x ≤ X) and y (0 ≤ y ≤ Y ) the fraction of congregators and contrarians
in state 1, respectively. Therefore, there are a fraction of X − x congregators and Y − y
contrarians in state 0.
3
A congregator in state 0 (1) turns to state 1 (0) with a rate that increases with the number
of agents with state 1 (0); we assume a well-mixed population. We introduce nonlinearity
to the conversion rate such that the rate equation for the number of congregators in state 1
is given by
x˙ = r[(X − x)(x+ y)d − x(1− x− y)d], (1)
where r(> 0) is a parameter, and d(> 0) represents the degree of the nonlinearity. With
d = 1, the conversion rate is proportional to the number of agents in the opposite state, as
is the case for the voter model. There is no nonlinearity in this case. The model with d = 1
is equivalent to Model 3 in Ref. [20]. With d > 1, the congregators obey a majority rule
because (x+y)d/(1−x−y)d > (x+y)/(1−x−y) if and only if the density of 1 agents (i.e.,
x+ y) is larger than that of 0 agents (i.e., 1 − x− y). In particular, when d ≥ 1 is integer,
Eq. (1) can be interpreted as a unanimity rule [25] in which a congregator simultaneously
meets randomly selected d agents and flips the state if all the d agents possess the opposite
state. In contrast, Eq. (1) represents a minority rule when d < 1. Similarly, the rate equation
for the contrarians is given by
y˙ = (Y − y)(1− x− y)d − y(x+ y)d. (2)
When r = 1, congregators and contrarians update their states at the same rate. Equa-
tions (1) and (2) are invariant under the transformation (x, y)→ (X − x, Y − y), reflecting
the symmetry between the two states.
III. LOCAL STABILITY ANALYSIS
First, we seek the equilibria of the rate equations (1) and (2). A linear combination of
Eqs. (1) and (2) under x˙ = 0 and y˙ = 0 yields
x
X
+
y
Y
= 1. (3)
Equation (1) under x˙ = 0 leads to
x+ y =
1
1 +
(
X−x
x
)1/d . (4)
The intersction of Eqs. (3) and (4) on the x–y plane gives the equilibria. We denote by f(x)
the right-hand side of Eq. (4). Equations (3) and (4) are drawn on the x–z plane, where
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z ≡ x + y, by the solid line and the dotted lines, respectively, in Fig. 1(a) with X = 0.6,
Y = 0.4, and different values of d. It should be noted that Eq. (3) does not depend on the d
value. The two lines are invariant under the transformation (x, z)→ (X−x, 1−z). The two
lines cross at (x, z) = (X/2, 1/2) for any d such that (x, y) = (X/2, Y/2) is an equilibrium.
We call this equilibrium the egalitarian equilibrium. In the egalitarian equilibrium, the
number of congregators in state 0 is equal to that of congregators in state 1, and the same
holds true for the contrarians.
If d ≥ 1 (d ≤ 1), f(x) is concave (convex) for 0 ≤ x ≤ X/2 and convex (concave) for
X/2 ≤ x ≤ X . When (X − Y )/X < f ′(X/2), there is no other equilibrium. A pitchfork
bifurcation occurs when (X − Y )/X = f ′(X/2), i.e.,
d =
1
X − Y
. (5)
Equation (5) is satisfied by a positive d value if X > Y . In Fig. 1(a), Eq. (5) is equivalent
to d = 5 because we set X = 0.6 and Y = 0.4. When (X − Y )/X > f ′(X/2), there are two
other equilibria, whose positions are symmetric about the egalitarian equilibrium (d = 9
in Fig. 1(a)). A bifurcation diagram with d being the bifurcation parameter is shown in
Fig. 1(b). It should be noted that the results shown in Fig. 1 are independent of the value
of r.
The Jacobian at the egalitarian equilibrium, calculated from Eqs. (1) and (2), is given by
J |(x,y)=(X/2,Y/2) =
1
2d−1

 r(dX − 1) rdX
−dY −dY − 1

 . (6)
For the rescaled Jacobian J˜ ≡ 2d−1J |(x,y)=(X/2,Y/2), we obtain
det(J˜) = r[1− d(X − Y )] (7)
and
tr(J˜) = d(rX − Y )− r − 1. (8)
The egalitarian equilibrium is stable if det(J˜) > 0 and tr(J˜) < 0, saddle if det(J˜) < 0,
and unstable (i.e., both eigenvalues have positive real parts) if det(J˜) > 0 and tr(J˜) >
0. The parameter values satisfying det(J˜) = 0 and tr(J˜) = 0 for various values of the
fraction of congregators (i.e., X), d, and r are shown by solid and dashed lines in Fig. 2,
respectively. The dotted lines in Fig. 2(b) and 2(c) represent the parameter values at which
5
[tr(J˜)]2 − 4 det(J˜) = 0. The parameters in the regions sandwiched by the two dotted lines
yield Im(λ˜i) 6= 0.
Figure 2 clarifies the stability of the egalitarian equilibrium. When r = 1, the egalitarian
equilibrium is never unstable because tr(J˜) < 0 whenever det(J˜) > 0 (Fig. 2(a)). Because
det(J˜) = 0 is equivalent to Eq. (5), the pitchfork bifurcation occurs on the solid lines in
Fig. 2. As we increase X or d in Fig. 2(a), the egalitarian equilibrium turns from stable
to saddle node via the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation. The two stable equilibria that
are symmetric with respect to the egalitarian equilibrium emerge through the pitchfork
bifurcation. We call the two equilibria the lopsided equilibria. The lopsided equilibria
correspond to the branches that exist for d > 5 in Fig. 1(b). In each lopsided equilibrium,
one state is dominant in the congregator population, and the other state is dominant in the
contrarian population.
When r = 3 (Fig. 2(b)) and r = 10 (Fig. 2(c)), the egalitarian equilibrium loses stability
via the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation or the supercritical Hopf bifurcation as X or d
increases. For relatively largeX and small d values, the egalitarian equilibrium is destabilized
via the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, similar to the case of r = 1. For relatively
small X and large d values, the egalitarian equilibrium is destabilized via the supercritical
Hopf bifurcation such that the egalitarian equilibrium becomes unstable spiral (i.e., two
eigenvalues with positive real parts and nonzero imaginary parts) and a limit cycle surrounds
the egalitarian equilibrium. If we further increase X or d to cross the upper dotted line in
Fig. 2(b) or 2(c), the egalitarian equilibrium turns from unstable spiral to unstable node
(i.e., two positive real eigenvalues). The egalitarian equilibrium turns from unstable node to
saddle via the subcritical pitchfork bifurcation as we further increase X or d to cross the solid
line in Fig. 2(b) or 2(c). The two lopsided equilibria are unstable upon their appearance.
IV. GLOBAL DYNAMICS
The global dynamics when r = 1 is implied in Fig. 2(a); there are two phases. When X
or d is relatively small, the egalitarian equilibrium is the unique stable equilibrium. When
X and d are relatively large, the egalitarian equilibrium is saddle and the state space is
symmetrically divided into the two attaractive basins of the two lopsided equilibria.
In the following, we focus on global dynamics of the model when r = 3. To understand
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the dynamics starting from arbitrary initial conditions, we set X = 0.6 and Y = 0.4 and
numerically investigate the dynamics for various values of d (Fig. 3). Figure 4 schematically
summarizes the results shown in Fig. 3.
We showed in the previous section that the egalitarian equilibrium experiences the super-
critical Hopf bifurcation when X = 0.6 (Fig. 2(b)). The Hopf bifurcation occurs at d ≈ 2.86.
The equilibrium is stable spiral when d is slightly smaller than d ≈ 2.86 (Fig. 3(a); also see
Fig. 4(a) for schematic) and unstable spiral accompanied by a stable limit cycle when d is
slightly larger than d ≈ 2.86 (Figs. 3(b) and 4(b)). The imaginary part of the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix at the egalitarian equilibrium vanishes at d ≈ 3.98 such that the
equilibrium turns from unstable spiral to unstable node as d increases (Fig. 4(c)). Then,
the subcritical pitchfork bifurcation occurs at d = 5. When d is slightly larger than five, the
egalitarian equilibrium is saddle and two lopsided equilibriua are unstable nodes (Figs. 3(c)
and 4(d)).
The red lines in Figs. 3(c)–3(i) represent the unstable manifolds of the egalitarian equi-
librium when it is saddle. The green lines in the same figures represent the stable manifolds
of the egalitarian equilibrium. As d increases, the imaginary part of the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at the lopsided equilibria becomes nonzero at d ≈ 5.59 such that
the lopsided equilibria turn from unstable nodes to unstable spirals (Fig. 4(e)). When the
two lopsided equilibria are unstable, regardless of whether they are nodes or spirals, trajec-
tories starting from arbitrary initial conditions eventually tend to the limit cycle (blue and
magenta lines in Fig. 3(c)).
At d ≈ 6.47, the lopsided equilibria experience the subcritical Hopf bifurcation such
that they become stable and an unstable limit cycle surrounding each lopsided equilibrium
appears. When d = 6.5, for example, the region inside each unstable limit cycle is the
attractive basin of each lopsided equilibrium (shaded regions in Figs. 3(d) and 4(f)). Any
other initial condition either from inside or outside the outer limit cycle is attracted to
this limit cycle, except when the initial condition is located on the stable manifold of the
egalitarian equilibrium (green lines in Fig. 3(d)). The size of the attractive basin of the
lopsided equilibrium increases with d (Fig. 3(e)).
A homoclinic bifurcation, in which the stable and unstable manifolds of the egalitarian
equilibrium collide, occurs at d ≈ 6.7196 (Figs. 3(f) and 4(g)). For d values that are a
slightly larger d ≈ 6.7196, the two attractive basins of the lopsided equilibriua infinitely
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twine with each other (Figs. 3(g), 3(h), and 4(h)). The boundaries between the intertwined
attractive basins are given by the stable manifold of the egalitarian equilibrium (green lines
in Figs. 3(g) and 3(h)). A magnification of the solid square region in Fig. 3(h) is shown
in the inset. Trajectories starting from the orange region in the inset once approach the
right lopsided equilibrium before they converge to the left lopsided equilibrium. Trajectories
starting from the thin purple region that in fact exists above the orange band in the inset
rotates around the two lopsided equilibria once before they converge to the right lopsided
equilibrium.
At d ≈ 6.7294, the stable limit cycle collides with the unstable limit cycle surrounding
the two attractive basins of the lopsided equilibria via the saddle–node bifurcation of cycles.
As a result, both the stable and unstable limit cycles disappear for d > 6.7294. It should
be noted that, different from the conventional saddle–node bifurcation of cycles, the inner
unstable limit cycle in the present case in fact consists of an unstable limit cycle inside
which the two attractive basins are intermingled with each other. When d > 6.7294, initial
conditions outside the remnant of the stable limit cycle are attracted to either lopsided
equilibrium (blue line in Fig. 3(i)) such that the two attractive basins exhaust the entire
state space (Figs. 3(i) and 4(i)). The size of the attractive basin for each lopsided equilibrium
discontinuously increases at d ≈ 6.7294.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed dynamics of a nonlinear opinion formation model with contrarian agents.
Our bifurcation analysis revealed that there were three types of stable limit set: the egali-
tarian equilibrum (i.e., the two states coexist with the equal fractions), lopsided equilibria
(i.e., one state prevails among congregators and the opposite state prevails among the con-
trarians), and limit cycle. The existence of these three types of behavior has been known
for opinion formation models with contrarian agents [6–9, 11, 17–19, 24]. Our contribution
lies in detailed numerical analysis of such a model revealing rich bifurcation scenarios. The
realized behavior depends on the fraction of congregators (i.e., X), strength of nonlinear
majority voting (i.e., d), and the relative speed at which the two types of agents flip the
state (i.e., r). The lopsided equilibria and the limit cycle can coexist as stable limit sets
for some parameter values. In this case, the realized behavior is determined by the initial
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condition. The stable limit cycle appears for intermediate values of d under the condition
that the congregators update the state faster than the contrarians do (i.e., r > 1). In fact,
electoral cyclical patterns have been empirically and theoretically investigated for a long
time in social sciences [26, 27].
The same bifurcation scenario as that shown in Fig. 4 is known for a two-dimensional
variant of the so-called Kaldor business cycle model [28, 29]. However, their model and
ours are different. The Kaldor models represent dynamics of business cycles, and the two
variables in the model considered in Refs. [28, 29] represent the income level and capital
stock. The two variables interact through ex ante investment and saving variables that are
functions of the income and capital stock. In contrast, our model is an opinion formation
model in which agents interact through like-dislike interactions. The two variables in our
model represent the fractions of agents with a certain opinion in the two subpopulations
of agents. Furthermore, the sequence of bifurcations as shown in Fig. 4 is realized by the
Kaldor model [28, 29] when the two main parameter values are changed along a nonlinear
trajectory (Fig. 1 of [29]). In our model, the same bifuraction scenario occurs by changing
a single bifurcation paremter (i.e., strength of the nonlinear majority voting).
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FIG. 1. (a) Nullclines. The solid line represents Eq. (3) and the four dotted lines represent Eq. (4)
with d = 0.5, 1, 5, and 9. (b) Bifurcation diagram. A pitchfork bifurcation occurs at d = 5 such
that three equilibria exist when d > 5. We set X = 0.6 and Y = 0.4 in both (a) and (b).
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FIG. 2. Stability of the egalitarian equilibrium. We set (a) r = 1, (b) r = 3, and (c) r = 10. The
solid lines represent det(J˜) = 0. The dashed lines represent tr(J˜) = 0. The dotted lines represent
[tr(J˜)]2 − 4 det(J˜) = 0. In (b) and (c), Im(λi) 6= 0 in the regions bounded by the two dotted lines.
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FIG. 3. Dynamics and attractive basins on the x–y plane. We set X = 0.6, Y = 0.4, r = 3,
(a) d = 2.0, (b) d = 4.0, (c) d = 6.0, (d) d = 6.5, (e) d = 6.71, (f) d = 6.7196, (g) d = 6.721,
(h) d = 6.729, and (i) d = 6.73. The filled circles represent the stable equilibrium, i.e., stable
node or stable spiral. The open circles represent the unstable equilibrium, i.e., unstable node or
unstable spiral, or saddle. The green and red lines represent the stable and unstable manifolds
of the egalitarian equilibrium, respectively. The orange and purple shaded regions represent the
attractive basins of the two lopsided equilibria. The blue lines represent the trajectories starting at
(x, y) = (0.1, 0.1). The magenta line in (c) represents the trajectory starting at (x, y) = (0.32, 0.1).
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FIG. 4. Schematic illustration of cascades of bifurcations as we increase d with X = 0.6, Y = 0.4,
and r = 3.
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